| August/September 1998 |
Attorneys DisciplinedOsmond A. Burton, Jr. By Supreme Court Order dated April 24, 1998, Osmond A. Burton, Jr., 111 S. Church, Ste. 209, Tucson, was suspended from the practice of law for one year, for conduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in six separate matters. This matter went before the Disciplinary Commission, pursuant to Rule 56(a), Ariz.R.S.Ct., for review of a proposed agreement for discipline by consent. The Commission recommended acceptance of the agreement providing for a one-year suspension and that restitution be made by Burton on two matters. In the first matter, Burton failed to adequately communicate with his client, failed to provide diligent representation to his client and failed to provide his client with an accounting in a legal malpractice matter. In another matter, Burton was retained to prevent a trustee’s sale of his clients’ home and to resolve tax indebtedness. Burton committed the clients to certain performance without their express authority, misinformed them about the status and effect of his negotiations with the IRS and failed to adequately communicate with them. In addition, throughout his representation, Burton frequently continued or delayed matters and falsely reassured his clients that their interests were being adequately protected. In a third matter, Burton was retained for a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, slander and defamation. Because Burton failed to timely file the complaint, the slander and defamation claims were dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Burton failed to diligently prosecute the action and maintain adequate communication with his client, and eventually informed her that he had committed malpractice. Thereafter, Burton entered into a settlement agreement on two occasions but failed to make all the payments as agreed. Burton entered into a third agreement and has made monthly payments as due. In another matter, Burton was retained for representation in a securities arbitration, which resulted in an adverse ruling. The client chose to appeal and Burton informed her that the appeal would require an additional retainer, which he deposited in his general account rather than his trust account, after already commencing work on the appeal. Before services were completed, the client changed her mind and requested a refund. Burton had depleted the entire sum and did not make repayment promptly as promised. The client retained counsel and eventually obtained full repayment, plus interest. In a fifth matter, after Burton failed to fully satisfy the civil disclosure requirements, he was precluded from presenting crucial testimony, and the case was dismissed with prejudice against his client. When Burton informed his client of his negligence, the client agreed to a monetary settlement. Burton failed to pay and the client retained counsel to assist with collection. An agreement was eventually entered into, whereby Burton sent ten checks to his client to be deposited on a semi-monthly basis. Contrary to Burton’s understanding, the client deposited all of the checks at a time when Burton did not have sufficient funds to cover the checks. The checks were dishonored. Burton and the client subsequently entered into another agreement for payment, with which Burton failed to fully comply. Burton then agreed with the client to a modified payment plan, including interest. In the last matter, Burton was retained for defense in a specific performance and breach of contract action regarding a failed real estate transaction. The client prevailed and the court awarded attorney fees, which Burton deposited into his own account, believing there was an outstanding balance owed him by the client. Burton recalled that the client directed him to deliver the file to another attorney, although he did not recall which one and did not have the file in his possession. Burton also failed to adequately communicate with his client. Burton eventually paid the attorney fees to the client to rectify the misunderstanding about the handling of the funds. Burton’s conduct was in violation of ER 1.1, ER 1.2, ER 1.3, ER 1.4, ER 1.15, ER 1.16(d), ER 4.1, ER 8.4, Ariz.R.S.Ct., and Supreme Court Rule 44. Burton was also assessed the State Bar’s costs in the amount of $1,002.46, together with interest, and ordered to pay restitution in two of the matters. Robert J. Farrer By Supreme Court Order dated September 30, 1997, Robert J. Farrer, 10225 W. Thunderbird, Sun City, was suspended for five years for conduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in two separate matters. This matter arose out as a result of Farrer serving in the dual capacity of personal representative as well as attorney for the Estate of Martha Edmondson. Farrer also served as attorney for Bette C. Kelley, the sole beneficiary of the estate. Five months after Farrer became attorney for the estate and personal representative of the estate, he borrowed approximately $500,000 from the estate, after discussion with Kelley. At about the same time, Farrer arranged for Kelley to renounce approximately $500,000 of her interest in the estate in favor of three charities designated under the will as contingent beneficiaries. The net effect of the renunciation was to save the estate about $200,000 of estate taxes. Sometime thereafter, Farrer borrowed an additional $300,000 to $500,000 from Kelley. All loans were documented with promissory notes. Kelley renounced her interest in the estate in the fall of 1987. The charitable beneficiaries were not notified until the spring of 1989. When notified, they were told they would be receiving payments from Farrer’s promissory note. All loan transactions were documented. Although at the hearing Farrer was unable to produce any time records or other records associated with his representation, he acknowledged that the estate had paid in excess of $100,000 in fees. A substantial portion of his fees related to time spent with Kelley discussing his loans. In addition, he had no written fee agreement. The State Bar’s expert testified that a maximum of $10,000 in fees should have been charged. Farrer also failed to avoid a conflict of interest when he borrowed $500,000 from the estate after Kelley’s renunciation. He also failed to advise the charities of the loans he was taking. Farrer’s conduct was in violation of ER 1.5, ER 1.7, ER 1.8, ER 4.1 and ER 8.4, Ariz.R.S.Ct. Farrer was also ordered to pay $90,000 in restitution to Kelley and was assessed the State Bar’s costs in the amount of $7,640.18, together with interest. William C. Horton By Supreme Court Order dated April 30, 1998, William C. Horton, 3225 N. Central, 3rd Floor, Phoenix, was placed on interim suspension effective April 30, 1998. Horton shall remain on interim suspension pending resolution of the disciplinary charges pending against him. James R. Hustad By Supreme Court Order dated December 26, 1997, James R. Hustad, 4500 S. Lakeshore, Suite 300, Tempe, was suspended from the practice of law for one year for conduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In or around August 1992, Hazel Gorden retained Hustad in matters involving the probate of her sister’s estate. Thereafter, Hustad filed a proof of notice on behalf of Ms. Gorden, which stated that a notice of hearing for the September 15, 1992 hearing had been mailed on September 1, 1992. This would have provided the statutorily required 14 days of notice. At the hearing, the court issued a minute entry finding that the decedent’s holographic will was valid and ordered Hustad to submit a proposed form of order. Rather than submit a form of order simply stating that the will was valid, however, he submitted a proposed form of order that contained additional findings not included in the judge’s minute entry. One finding was that notice had been given or had been waived by all interested parties. Another finding was that there were only three heirs or devisees of the decedent. A third finding was that Hazel Gorden was entitled to be appointed as personal representative of her sister’s estate. In fact, there were 20 heirs/devisees and all were not served with a copy of the order; another sister, Vera Gorden, had already been appointed as personal representative and that Hazel Gorden had previously renounced her right as personal representative. When opposing counsel discovered the existence of the order, he filed a motion to set aside and a request for a new trial, alleging improper notice. Hustad filed a response, which asserted a frivolous defense and had no basis in law or fact. In subsequent hearings, additional Rule 11 sanctions were levied against Hustad. He later filed a frivolous motion to recuse the judge that did not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. He was sanctioned $5,000 by the court. On July 5, 1995, Hustad filed a civil action against opposing counsel, alleging abuse of process. The action was both frivolous and harassing. The complaint was dismissed and additional sanctions were awarded against Hustad. Hustad’s conduct was in violation of ER 3.1, ER 3.3(a)(1), ER 3.4(c), and ER 8.4(c) Ariz.R.S.Ct. Hustad was also assessed the State Bar’s costs in the amount of $1,383.32, together with interest. Richard C. Parks, II By Supreme Court Order dated October 28, 1997, Richard C. Parks, II, P.O. Box 12009-478, Phoenix, was placed on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 52(c), Ariz.R.S.Ct. The suspension shall continue in effect until final disposition of all proceedings pending against Parks. George R. Roylston By Supreme Court Order dated May 22, 1998, George R. Roylston, 135 W. Council St., Tucson, was placed on interim suspension effective June 21, 1998. Roylston shall remain on interim suspension pending resolution of the disciplinary charges pending against him. Scott A. Stewart By Supreme Court Order dated December 26, 1997, Scott A. Stewart, 338 E. Tuckey Lane, Phoenix, was suspended for two years retroactive to September 24, 1996, for conduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in seven separate matters. These matters all represent a pattern of misconduct whereby after Stewart was retained to perform legal services, he failed to provide the work and failed to communicate with his clients. In essence, he abandoned the practice of law. Stewart also failed to cooperate with the State Bar during its initial investigation. Stewart’s conduct was in violation of ER 1.3, ER 1.4, ER 1.5, ER 1.15, ER 1.16(d), ER 3.2, ER 3.4 and ER 8.1(b) and Rule 51(h), Ariz.R.S.Ct. Extensive evidence mitigation was established by Stewart. He developed severe substance abuse addictions brought on by two failed marriages and a damaged relationship with his only child. However, he has gone into recovery and his prognosis for remission of drug dependence is good. Stewart was also assessed the State Bar’s costs in the amount of $1,347.41, together with interest. Patricia L. Walker By Supreme Court Order dated May 21, 1998, Patricia L. Walker, 5701 S. Rural Road, #204, P. O. Box 1599, Chandler, was placed on interim suspension effective June 20, 1998. Walker shall remain on interim suspension pending resolution of the disciplinary charges pending against her. Chris G. Weisling By Supreme Court Order dated November 17, 1997, Chris G. Weisling, 8139 W. Greer Ave., Peoria, was suspended for nine months for conduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in two separate matters. In the first matter, Weis-ling was retained to assist clients with problems involving child support. Weisling failed to perform the work for which he was retained and failed to adequately communicate with them as well. In the second matter, Weisling was retained to represent a client in a matter involving DES. Weisling failed to diligently represent his client and failed to communicate with him as well. Weisling received notice of a February 29, 1996 hearing, but informed his client that he did not need to appear at the hearing. Weisling failed to appear at the hearing and the court found that Weisling had abandoned his client. Weisling failed to respond to the State Bar of Arizona in both matters. Weisling’s conduct was in violation of ER 1.3, ER 1.4, ER 3.4, ER 8.1(b) and Supreme Court Rules 43, 44 and 51(h) and (i). Weisling was also assessed the State Bar’s costs in the amount of $593.10, together with interest. |